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ABSTRACT: This article explores potential treaty defenses and valuation defenses for host States to
mitigate or temporarily excuse non-performance of obligations owed to investors during economic
emergencies, arising from the host State's good faith performance of obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Defenses under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), such as the lex posterior rule of application of treaties in
Article 30 or treaty interpretation in Article 31, are of limited utility for avoiding primary breaches of
the investment treaty, since these defenses considerably depend upon the host State's a priori
notification of ICESCR obligations to investors at the time of the establishment of the investment.
Lacking these revisions to the due diligence process, it is submitted that a host State can advance a
more pragmatic defense by proposing equitable adjustments in the valuation of compensation, taking
into account the host State's good faith performance qf ICESCR obligations. Adjustments are
justifiable and appropriate, since tribunals tend to accept an unrealistic definition qf the fair market
value' standard, based on market assumptions of perfect competition, for pre-crisis valuations of
investments. The bloating of the pre-crisis valuation qf an investment thus tends to increase its ultimate
differential with the post-crisis valuation qf an investment, leading to damage assessments beyond what
parties could ordinarily have foreseen from the investment contract. While tribunals have
predominantly referred to 'compensation' within the general law of international responsibility, they
have problematically neglected the counterpart practice of equitable adjustment within this legal
regime.
While it is imperative to respond to the current crises with a thorough
review of the functioning of the international financial and monetary
mechanisms, a human rights approach will contribute to making solutions
more durable in the medium and long run... A human rights framework
offers the appropriate context, legal rationale and ground to guide policies
and programmes countering the negative effects of the financial crisis at
the national, regional and international levels. Indeed, States are not
relieved of their human rights obligations in times of crisis...
- Navanethem Pillay (2009)1
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The aim of social justice in a liberal state is not to build yet another
community in which all are enslaved in the name of some grand collective
ideal. Instead, it is to construct a form of community in which each
participant is guaranteed the right to live his own life regardless of what
his neighbors may think of him.
- Bruce Ackerman (1980)2
We are all Keynesians now.
- Joseph Stiglitz (2008)'
1. INTRODUCTION: AUTHORITATIVE DECISION-MAKERS
IN ECONOMIC EMERGENCIES
Governments serve the public interest through regulation, social protection, and development
generation. Economic emergencies challenge a government's ability to discharge each of these
mandates fully, especially for those who subscribe to the view that '[t]he core purpose of the
State is protection'. 4 Throughout the history of financial and economic crises, governments
have deliberately intervened in order to advance social protection objectives that have been
imperiled by market failures.' The wisdom of these interventions has not gone unchallenged.
Economists such as Friedrich von Hayek and others of similar libertarian persuasion argue that
governmental interventions result in price and tax distortions detrimental to the capital and
financial markets, which could ultimately prolong economic crises and further deepen income
cleavages.6
According to the taxonomy set by economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff,
economic emergencies usually take the forms of 'inflation crises', 'currency crashes',
'currency debasement', 'banking crises', 'external debt crises', 'domestic debt crises', and
'serial defaults'.' In addressing such crises, governments' economic emergency measures
2 Bruce Ackerman. Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale University Press. 1980). at p. 376.
Joseph Stiglitz. 'Keynesian economics finds new relevancy in the 2Ist century global economy', The Guardian. 5
December 2008, available at www.guardian.co.uklcommentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/05/us-economy-keynesian-
economic-theory (last accessed 25 February 2012).
4 Martin Wolf, 'What is the role of the State', The Financial Times, 8 August 2010, at http://blogs.ft.com/martin-
wolf-exchange/2010/08/08/what-is-the-role-of-the-state/#axzzlp6QB3fYF (last accessed 25 February 2012).
See Baird Webel, N. Eric Weiss, Marc Labonte, 'Cost of Government Financial Interventions, Past and Present',
pp. 61-66 in Pablo Sastre (eds.), Government Interventions in Economic Emergencies (Nova Science Publishers,
2011).
6 On counter-arguments against Keynesian fiscal stimulus packages, see Peter J. Boettke, Daniel J. Smith, and
Nicholas A. Snow, 'Been there done that: the political economy of ddjA vu', pp. 23-26 in Steven Kates (eds.). The
Global Financial Crisis: What Have We Learnt? (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011); Brett H. McDonnell, 'Of Mises
and Min(sky): Libertarian and Liberal Responses to Financial Crises Past and Present', 34 Seattle University Law
Review 1279 (2011), at pp. 1290-1299. For a recent illustration of the Austrian business cycle theories and the
worsening effect of macroeconomic policy responses to financial crises, see Andreas Hoffmann and Gunther
Schnabl, 'A Vicious Cycle of Manias. Crashes and Asymmetric Policy Responses - An Overinvestment View'.
CESifo Working Paper No. 2855, November 2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id
=1513171 (last accessed 25 May 2012).
7 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton
University Press, 2009), at pp. 3-14. An 'inflation crisis' is set at a 'threshold of 20 percent per annum'. A
'currency crash' is defined as 'an annual depreciation in excess of 15 percent'. 'Currency debasements' are of two
types, the first being 'a reduction in the metallic content of coins in circulation of 5 percent or more', and the
second being a 'currency reform whereby a new currency replaces a much-depreciated earlier currency in
circulation.' A 'banking crisis' is marked by two types of events: '(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging,
or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions', and '(2) if there are no runs, the closure.
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encompass a variable mix of market stabilization and social protection policies,8 as seen
recently in the unprecedented magnitude of the Obama administration's fiscal stimulus and
social protection package in response to the 2008 crisis, and European states' acceptance of
direct intervention in crisis-beset jurisdictions within the Eurozone.9
The uncertain form and remit of governmental interventions during economic
emergencies could conceivably result in host State breaches of investment treaty standards of
protection. For example, as a matter of normative and policy priority during an economic
emergency, a host State may be pressed to wield police powers according to its own sense of
distributive justice and the good faith fulfillment of its citizens' social and economic rights,
even if such measures interrupt foreign investors' receipt of expected returns under the
investment contract with the host State. Argentina has attempted to argue precisely this context
to justify investor deprivations arising from a whole host of pesification policies, transfer
prohibitions, concession cancellations, and other governmental measures that it imposed during
the 2001-2002 financial crisis,' 0 using its version of the defense of necessity (or emergency) to
make investment treaties wholly inapplicable to emergency measures enforcing economic and
social rights.'' Due to the high probative threshold and strict elements of Article 25 of the ILC
Articles of State Responsibility, as well as the actual textual parameters of the 'necessity'
clauses in the investment treaties, the overwhelming majority of arbitral tribunals to date
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of
institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions'. 'External debt
crises' are those that 'involve outright default on a government's external debt obligations - that is. a default on a
payment to creditors of a loan issued under another country's jurisdiction, typically (but not always) denominated
in a foreign currency, and typically held mostly by foreign creditors.' 'Domestic debt crises' are those that
'typically occur against a backdrop of much worse economic conditions than the average external default', where
domestic debt is 'denominated in the local currency and held mainly by residents'. 'Serial defaults' refer to the
'multiple sovereign defaults on external or domestic public (or publicly guaranteed) debt, or both. These defaults
may occur five or fifty years apart. and they can range from wholesale default (or repudiation) to partial default
through rescheduling (usually stretching interest payments out at more favourable terms for the debtor.'
Anne van Aaken and Jlrgen Kurtz, 'Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, The Global Financial
Crisis, and International Economic Law'. 12 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2009). pp. 859-894. at 862.
9 See full text of the January 31, 2012 EU intergovernmental treaty on the Eurozone ('Treaty on Stability,
Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union'), at www.european-council.europa.eu/media
/579087/treaty.pdf (last accessed 25 February 2012). See 'Ghost of Keynes haunts the Eurozone', Editorial, The
Financial Times, 16 August 2011, available at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/402fdf1c-c7fe-1 1e0-9501-00144feabdcO.h
tml#axzzlnsx9lX6v (last accessed 25 February 2012); Charles Moore, 'Keynes' wisdom is perfect for the
Eurozone'. The Telegraph. 20 February 2012. available at www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/charlesmoor
e/9092602/Keyness-wisdom-is-perfect-for-the-eurozone.html (last accessed 25 February 2012).
0 See among others LG&E Energy Corp and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB 02/1
3 October 2006, paras. 213-266: Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Decision on Argentina's Application
for Annulment of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 29 June 2010, paras. 106-223; CMS Gas Transmission
Company v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 25 April 2005, paras. 315-392; Enron Corporation
and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 22 May 2007, paras. 303-339 (paras.
355-405 in the Decision on the Application for Annulment); Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9. 5 September 2008, paras. 219-285; BG Group PLC v. Argentina, Final Award. Ad hoc
(UNCITRAL), 24 December 2007, paras. 361-444: National Grid PLC v. Argentina, Award, Ad hoc
(UNCITRAL). 3 November 2008, paras. 205-262: Suez and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability. ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010. paras. 249-271; Total SA v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/1, 21 December 2010, paras. 482-485; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 27 October 2011, paras. 552-670; Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011, paras. 336-360; Metalpar SA and Buen Aire SA v. Argentina, Award
on the Merits, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, 6 June 2008, paras. 208-211.
" Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National Emergency Clauses: Sovereignty in Modern Treaty Interpretation
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). at pp. 171-175 [hereafter, 'Desierto 2012'].
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continue to reject Argentina's singular version of the necessity defense. 12 As I have shown
elsewhere, a 'necessity clause within the terms of a treaty cannot be easily presumed to provide
for treaty inapplicability, denunciation, or termination, unless its terms clearly and
unambiguously provide for these effects." 3
Notwithstanding Argentina's lack of success in its resort to the defense of necessity,
however, the broader problem of mitigating or excusing host States' good faith social
protection measures that intentionally breach investment protection standards remains one of
the most significant controversies in international investment law. The fact that this
controversy has not frequently dominated investment arbitrations is an indication of difficulties
in litigating social and economic rights as independent defenses. As Christoph Schreuer and
Clara Reiner aptly observed, while some States have used human rights as defenses to
investment claims, arbitral tribunals have preferred to 'dismiss the issues raised on a procedural
basis rather than dealing with the substantive arguments themselves.'1 4 Other than Argentina's
collateral invocation of social and economic rights in relation to its version of the necessity
defense, no host State has substantially developed defenses based on the independent legal
quality of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
This article aims to explore potential treaty and valuation defenses in relation to the host
State's good faith performance of ICESCR obligations during economic emergencies. It takes
its cue from the watershed 2010 award in Suez and ors v. Argentina, where an arbitral tribunal
first took the categorical position that a host State is indeed obligated to observe both its human
rights and investment treaty obligations during economic emergencies. While Argentina
unsuccessfully invoked the defense of necessity in relation to the general right to water,16 it was
significant that the Suez tribunal considered social and economic rights dispositive to its legal
reasoning. However, the Suez tribunal fell short of discussing how human rights and investment
obligations could indeed have been met by Argentina during the crisis, since the tribunal held
that on the facts of the case, Argentina failed to show its inability to discharge both obligations
at the time of the 2001-2002 crisis. Significantly, Suez also stands as the only arbitration to date
that accepted amicus curiae intervention for the interpretation of fundamental social and
economic rights in relation to investment treaty standards." The thirty-page amicus brief in
Suez's identified the applicable human rights involved to be the right to water, right to life, and
12 See Desierto 2012, at pp. 145-236; Diane A. Desierto. 'Necessity and Supplementary Means of Interpretation
for Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 3 (2010), 827-934. available at
http: //effect.net.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume3 1 /issue3/Desierto3 1 U.Pa.J.Int'lL.827(2010).pdf (last
accessed 25 February 2012).
" Desierto 2012, at p. 126.
14 Clara Reiner and Christoph Schreuer, 'Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration', pp. 82-96, at
89-90 in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press. 2009) [hereafter, 'Dupuy, Francioni. &
Petersmann']. See also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, Award and Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22. 18 July 2008, at paras. 380 and 601.
" Suez and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19. 30 July 2010. para. 262.
6 Suez and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, paras. 250 and
252.
17 Suez and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, para. 256.
18 See full text of the Amicus Curiae Submission by Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Asociaci6n
Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ). Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisi6n de Servicios de
Acci6n Comunitaria Union de Usuarios y Consumidores. Center for International Environmental Law. 4 April
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related rights. The Suez amici argued that these human rights are included in the relevant
applicable law to the dispute as 'rules of international law' under Article 42(1) of the ICSID
Convention; 19 and as such, could be read to assist in the interpretation of the 'fair and equitable
treatment' (FET) standard and the 'indirect expropriation' standard in the bilateral investment
treaty (BIT).20 The bulk of the analysis in the Suez brief was devoted to this novel
reinterpretation of the FET and 'indirect expropriation', with a brief observation that human
rights law 'could displace investment law in a conflict of norms situation..'. 2 1 The amici chose
not to develop this argument further, finding that it was not necessary for the adjudication of the
case.2 2 These arguments have not been articulated or fully developed elsewhere since. 23
This article broadly aims to develop the discursive openings made in the 2010 Suez
award. It contrasts the limited utility of defenses under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), such as the lex posterior rule in the application of treaties under VCLT
Article 30 and the treaty interpretation rules in VCLT Article 31, with a more pragmatic
approach of equitably adjusting the quantum of compensation ultimately owed by host States
breaching investment treaty standards in the course of their good faith compliance with the
ICESCR during an economic emergency. It furthers the potential for social and economic rights
reasoning in the 2010 Suez award, by showing legal justifications for a host State's attempt to
observe both human rights and investment treaty obligations. But as I show in Part 2 (The
ICESCR and Treaty Defenses), the ability to effectively harness this strategy would be largely
constrained by the extent to which the host State included ICESCR compliance in the due
diligence process with investors at the time of establishment of the investment.
More importantly, this article addresses the reality of a host State's possible inability to
fulfill both sets of obligations during an economic emergency. As I show in Part 3 (The
ICESCR and Valuation Defenses), a host State can invite the attention of arbitral tribunals to
the importance of equitable adjustment in the valuation process for compensation. The arbitrary
practice of relying on a 'fair market value' standard, derived from perfectly competitive market
assumptions, cannot be realistically applied to valuations during economic emergencies. This
puts to question the accuracy of the 'pre-crisis valuation' and 'post-crisis valuation' of the
investment, which comprise the bases for comparison in determining the compensation owed
2007, at www.ciel.org/Publications/SUEZ Amicus English 4AprO7.pdf (last accessed 25 February 2012)
[hereafter, 'Suez amicus curiae brief'].
19 Id. at pp. 13-14.
20 Id. at pp. 15-26.
21 Id. at p. 26.
22 Id. at p. 26.
23 The recently-discontinued Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa arbitration was a missed opportunity to examine
potential amicus curiae submissions on the interpretation of social and economic rights alongside international
investment obligations, as this was a rare instance where the arbitral tribunal granted the petitions of various
non-governmental organizations (including the Center for International Environmental Law and the International
Commission of Jurists) to serve as non-disputing parties to the proceedings. The amici in the Foresti arbitration
never had the opportunity to submit their brief, since the investor chose to settle its claim against the South African
government. See Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/1, September 25, 2009 Procedural Order (on the granting of petitions of non-disputing parties), and
the August 4, 2010 Award (on discontinuance and costs). See Andrew Friedman, 'Flexible Arbitration for the
Developing World: Piero Foresti and the Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Global South', 7
International Law & Management Review pp. 37-51 (2010).
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by host States. Furthermore, I show that arbitral tribunals almost automatically transpose the
broad concept of 'compensation' under the general international law of international
responsibility, while neglecting the settled practice in this legal regime of determining
compensation quantum with regard to the objective of reaching 'equitable outcomes' for the
litigating parties. A host State's good faith fulfillment of its ICESCR obligations thus presents
one compelling case for equitable adjustment of compensation or damages owed to investors
during economic emergencies.
In the Conclusion (Investment and Human Rights as Complementary Spheres of the
Public Interest), I submit that both investment protection and human rights protection are
important and complementary spheres of the 'public interest'. Calibrating protections of both
sets of obligations during economic emergencies remains crucial to a host State's sustainable
economic development.
2. THE ICESCR AND TREATY DEFENSES
The ICESCR is a source of legally actionable and justiciable rights, the breach of which
engages international responsibility. 2 The ICESCR fundamentally calls upon States to
'respect' (not to impede access to ICESCR rights), 'protect' (prevent others from impeding
such access) and 'fulfill' (facilitate access to or directly provide social and economic goods)
ICESCR rights.
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR contains the core obligation of States in the form of the
4 26
'undertaking to take steps' to realize ICESCR rights. The tenor of the obligation is purposely
evolutionary ('to the maximum of available resources') and dynamic ('with a view to
progressively achieving the full realization of rights recognized in the present Covenant by
appropriate means'), in contrast with the discrete and readily-determinable obligation 'to
respect and to ensure' civil and political rights under Article 2(1) of the International Covenant
27
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights ('the Committee') explains the obligation 'to take steps' as one that should be
'deliberate, concrete, and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations
recognized in the Covenant,' 2 8 with the means to be used to fulfill the obligate to take steps
24 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 136. 181 at paras. 112. 131. 133-134. See International Commission of Jurists. Courts and
the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability,
(Human Rights and Rule of Law Series No. 2, International Commission of Jurists, 2008), available at
www.icj.org/dwn/database/ESCR.pdf (last accessed 25 February 2012), pp. 23-64.
25 Malcolm Langford and Jeff A. King, 'Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Past, Present and
Future', pp. 477-516, at 484 in Malcolm Langford (eds.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: emerging Trends in
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press. 2008).
26 ICESCR Art. 2(1): 'Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.'
27 ICCPR, Art. 2(1): 'Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction rights recognized in the present Covenant...'
28 CESCR General Comment 3 [The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1)], 14 December 1990, para.
2. at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424cl2563ed0052b664?Opendocument (last accessed
25 February 2012).
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being 'all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.' 29
Other possible appropriate measures may include, and are not limited to, 'administrative,
financial, educational and social measures.' 30
Most importantly, the Committee stresses that the 'principal obligation of result reflected
in article 2(1) is to take steps 'with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized' in the Covenant.'3 1 As such, States Parties to the ICESCR are obligated to
'move as expeditiously and effectively as possible' towards realizing ICESCR rights, and full
justification must be provided before 'deliberately retrogressive measures' are introduced.32
During economic emergencies, States Parties to the ICESCR remain bound to observe
33
minimum levels of protection, or 'the essential levels of each ICESCR right, without which a
right loses its substantive significance as a human right.' 34 In the words of the Committee,
maintaining the obligatory floor of minimum protection is 'the raison d'otre of the ICESCR'.3 1
The Committee has itself issued General Comments specifying the minimum core content of
36 31 38 39the right to food, the right to health, the right to social security, 8the right to water,
among others. While these General Comments are not legally binding in nature and are often
regarded as a form of soft law, they are not to be easily disregarded. The General Comments are
significant sources of authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR by the Committee, deriving
'from an explicit invitation to do so by the Economic and Social Council.' 4 0 Notably, domestic
constitutional courts have also accepted the obligatory floor of minimum socioeconomic
41protection during economic emergencies.
A host State acting to fulfill its ICESCR obligations during economic emergencies can
invoke two possible defenses within the domain of the law of treaties. First, it can argue that its
actions are consistent with the limited application of both the ICESCR and the investment
29 Id. at para. 3.
30 Id. at para. 7.
31 Id. at para. 9.
3 Id. Underscoring in the original.
' Id. at para. 12.3 4
' Magdalena Septilveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, 2003), at p. 366.
' CESCR General Comment 3 [The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1)], 14 December 1990, paras.
2 and 10 at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424cl2563ed0052b664?Opendocument (last
accessed 25 February 2012).
36 CESCR General Comment 12 [The right to adequate food (art. 11)]. 1999, para. 17. See also Rolf Kinnemann.
'The Right to Adequate Food: Violations Related to its Minimum Core Content'. pp. 161-183 in Audrey Chapman
and Sage Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(Intersentia, 2002).
n CESCR General Comment 14 [The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)], para. 43. See also Audrey R. Chapman, 'Core
Obligations Related to the Right to Health', pp. 185-215 in Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds.), Core
Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, 2002).
38 CESCR General Comment 19 [The right to social security (art. 9)]. 2007, para. 59. See also Lucie Lamarche.
'The Right to Social Security in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'. pp. 87-114
in Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds.). Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Intersentia. 2002).
9 CESCR General Comment No. 15 [The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)], 2002, para. 37.
40 Urfan Khaliq and Robin Churchill, 'The protection of economic and social rights: a particular challengeT pp.
199-260, at 204-207, and 207, in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), UA Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and
Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
41 Government ofSouth Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paras. 31-32; BVerfGE 40, 121 (133).
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treaty under VCLT Article 30. Second, it can argue that the ICESCR is a fundamental part of
host State law, and investment treaty protection can only be triggered for investments that are
'in accordance with host State law'. The limitations and possibilities of each defense are set
forth below.
2.1. Application of Treaties under VCLT Article 30
While there is considerable appeal in asserting the normative supremacy of the ICESCR as
'jus cogens' over investment treaty norms, a more careful dissection of this line of argument
reveals its defects. For one, it is difficult to prove that the ICESCR - with its divergent record
of States' ratifications, reservations, and modes of accession - is included within the limited
category of jus cogens or obligations erga omnes norms that have been recognized to date in
42international adjudication. More importantly, if the ICESCR is indeed jus cogens, VCLT
Article 53 would invalidate the investment treaty if it could be shown that it was already
incompatible with the ICESCR at the time the investment treaty was concluded. 43 The
invalidity ab initio of the investment treaty would arguably make it incumbent upon the host
State to return all benefits illegally obtained from the (supposedly) void treaty. VCLT Article
71 imposes a duty upon all States parties to a treaty deemed void for conflicting with jus
cogens to 'eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on
any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law', as well
as to 'bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general
international law.' 4 4 At best, the host State would not be permitted to unjustly enrich itself by
knowingly entering into a treaty that would conflict with jus cogens, and retaining the benefits
of a treaty that is void ab initio.4 5 Instead of exonerating itself from the duty to compensate
investors during an economic emergency by invoking the alleged jus cogens nature of the
ICESCR, the host State finds itself in the even worse situation of being internationally
obligated to return the actual principal of the investment (and the stream of benefits from such
investment) back to the investors as a result of the supposed invalidity ab initio of the
46investment treaty.
42 See Status of Ratifications, Accessions, and Reservations to the ICESCR in http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewD
etails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-3&chapter-4&lang=en (last accessed 9 March 2012); Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, IC.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, at pp. 31-32. para. 64 (on the prohibition
against genocide); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.CJ. Reports 1996, p.
226, at p. 258. para. 83: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I C.J Reports 1970, p.
3, at p. 32, paras. 33-34; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I. C.J Reports 1970,
p. 3, at p. 32, paras. 33-34 (on the right to self-determination); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.CJ. Reports 2004, p. 136, at p. 172, para. 88;
Jurisdictional Immunities ofthe State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of3 February 2012, I.C.J
Reports 2012, at paras. 95 and 97.
43 VCLT Article 53. See Mark E. Villiger. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), at pp. 674-675. [hereafter, 'Villiger'].
44 VCLT Article 71.
45 See Christoph Schreuer, 'Unjustified Enrichment in International Law', 22 Am. J. Comp. L. 295 (1974), at pp.
295-296 ('Restitution was also granted in situations where transfers of assets took place under putative agreements
which later turned out never to have been validly concluded.')
46 Plainly, this is a proverbial case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater (Das kindt mit dem bad vB
schitten). See Wolfgang Mieder and Wayland D. Hand, "(Don't) Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water": The
Americanization of a German Proverb and Proverbial Expression', 50 Western Folklore 4 (Oct. 1991), pp. 361-400.
at p. 361.
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Applying VCLT Article 30 preserves both the ICESCR and the investment treaty
obligations of the host State, but does not sufficiently address the question of international
responsibility for breach of either treaty. VCLT Article 30 applies whenever incompatibility
conceptually arises from the treaties that are subject of the comparison, regardless of the
actual 'subject-matter' designation of the treaties at hand.47 The ILC took this position in
viewing the applicability of VCLT Article 30,48 consistent with the earlier positions taken by
the ILC Special Rapporteurs on the Law of Treaties - Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, and Sir Humphrey Waldock.49
If the ICESCR is the earlier treaty than the investment treaty, VCLT Article 30(4)
would make the ICESCR applicable only 'to the extent that its provisions are compatible'
with the investment treaty. A possible way to show some compatibility between the ICESCR
minimum core obligation and the investment treaty duty to compensate would be for the host
State to recognize both obligations, but negotiate with the counterpart State (the State of the
nationality of the investor) as to the timing, mode, and form of payment of compensation
owed to such investors for the host State's expropriation of their investment. The investment
obligation to compensate remains, but it would clearly no longer be 'prompt' or 'immediately
payable', should the investor consent to the negotiated restructuring of payment terms.
Another way would be for the host State to recognize both obligations, but choose to satisfy
its obligation to compensate expropriatory acts through the issuance of sovereign debt
instruments, consistent with its fiscal powers, or possibly through the recognition of an
investor lien on government assets or receivables.50 It has been the accepted view that it is
only the 'non-payment of any compensation for an unreasonable length of time that cannot be
seen as lawful behavior because this would undermine the whole regime of international law
on expropriation ' So long as the duty to compensate is accepted, therefore, there can be
some differences as to the timing, mode, and terms of payment of compensation to an investor,
47 Benedetto Conforti, 'Consistency among Treaty Obligations', pp. 187-191 in Enzo Cannizzaro (eds.), The Law
of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 188; Alexander Orakhelashvili,
'Article 30 Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter', pp. 764-800, at p. 776 in Olivier
Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Vol. I (Oxford
University Press, 2011). ('...treaties can supplement each other by relating to the same subject matter (e.g. the case
of optional protocols). and whether they are in conflict depends on their actual terms. According to Vierdag, the
requirement of the sameness of the subject matter under Article 30 is satisfied if an attempted simultaneous
application of two rules to one set of facts or actions leads to incompatible results.') [hereafter. 'Corten and
Klein'].
48 International Law Commission, 'Commentary to the Draft Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties',
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, at p. 214, para. 1. [hereafter, 'ILC Commentary to
the VCLT']
49 See I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 1973), at pp.
62-64.
5o For a survey of public sector responses to, and fiscal strategies adopted as a result of, the global economic crisis
of 2008/2009, see United Nations, 'The Global Economic and Financial Crisis: Regional Impacts. Responses, and
Solutions' (2009): Alham Yusuf and Jonathan A. Batten, 'Currency Swaps and Australian Debt Management
Practice', pp. 294-306 in J. Jay Choi and Michael G. Papaioannou (eds.), Credit, Currency, or Derivatives:
Instruments of Global Financial Stability or Crisis? (Emerald Group Publishing, Limited, 2009); J.O.N. Perkins,
'Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Crisis Economies', pp. 14-27 in Tran Van Hoa, (eds.) Economic Crisis
Management: Policy, Practice, Outcomes and Prospects (Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2002).
51 Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, 2008). at p. 68.
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without necessarily triggering a breach of the obligation to pay compensation. 52 The host
State owes the obligation to its counterpart State in the investment treaty to observe the
obligation to compensate investors in good faith (pacta sunt servanda),53 and as long as the
tenor of this obligation does not specify a precise mode or form, there is room for the host
State to negotiate payment terms. When it is only the host State who is a party to both the
ICESCR and the investment treaty obligation, it is the investment treaty - as the 'treaty to
which both States are parties' that will govern the mutual rights and obligations of both
parties. Notably, VCLT Article 30 merely encapsulates a rule of thumb for the selection of the
applicable treaty, without discharging international responsibility from the breach of the treaty
not performed.54
2.2. ICESCR and treaty interpretation in VCLT Article 31
Reported arbitral awards to date do not indicate that host State respondents have fully pleaded
arguments based on economic and social rights. There has not yet been a reported arbitral
award in which the tribunal's determination of a BIT breach turned significantly on the issue of
the host State's observance of economic and social rights. In the 1999 Goetz v. Burundi
award, 5 it was the claimants (and not the host State) that invoked the ICESCR as part of the
applicable law governing an investment. The Belgian shareholders in a mining corporation
sued the Republic of Burundi for alleged breaches of obligations under Burundi law, the
ICESCR, and the Belgium-Luxembourg/Burundi BIT. In the arbitral award, the Goetz tribunal
evidently considered the non-discrimination principle in Article 2(2) of the ICESCR56 pursuant
to Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, but ultimately found that the claimants were unable
to establish their allegations of discrimination.5  Argentina had also generally invoked social
and economic rights as a matter of constitutional law in relation to the defense of necessity,58
which, in its view, automatically displaces international investment obligations. While the
notion of constitutional supremacy is a licit form of established constitutional reasoning, VCLT
Article 27 makes such internal law immaterial for purposes of assessing international legal
responsibility. 59
The bulk of literature to date on human rights and investment treaty obligations focuses
on the interpretive value of human rights norms as 'relevant rules of international law' within
the ambit of VCLT Article 31(3)(c).60 Arbitral tribunals to date have sparingly resorted to
52 Id. at p. 68: 'It would hardly be reasonable to suggest that for an expropriation to be considered lawful.
compensation actually paid must meet the required standard precisely. There is an inherent uncertainty underlying
the matter of compensation: international law does not provide a formula to calculate an exact amount to be paid in
a specific case that would reduce the calculation to a simple mathematical exercise... (Italics in the original.)
5 VCLT Article 26.
54 VCLT Article 30(5).
5 Goetz and ors v. Burundi, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, 10 February 1999.
56 ICESCR Article 2(2) states: 'The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex.
language. religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.'
1 Goetz and ors v. Burundi, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, 10 February 1999, at paras. 94-121.
58 National Grid PLC v. Argentina, Award of 3 November 2008, UNCITRAL, para. 78. See also paras. 86-90,
which discuss the sources of applicable law.
59 VCLT Article 27.
60 Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, 'Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First
Steps towards a Methodology', pp. 678-707 in Christina Binder, et al., International Investment Law for the 21 '
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VCLT Article 31(3)(c) as a treaty interpretation mechanism, due to its subordinate role to the
ordinary text of a treaty. 61 The arbitral tribunal in RosInvest Co. UK Ltd v. Russian Federation
required that such 'relevant rules' have to be those on which the performance of investment
62
obligations had been specifically conditioned. The arbitral tribunal in Berschader and
Berschader v. Russian Federation permitted resort to such 'relevant rules' only where there
63
was a patent ambiguity in the treaty text that called for supplementation.
Where the terms of the investment treaty do not facially appear to contain any discernible
reference to international human rights norms, arbitral tribunals have been demonstrably
reluctant to use VCLT Article 31(3)(c) as an all-purpose gateway for human rights-sensitive
interpretation. The arbitral tribunal in Micula and ors v. Romania invoked VCLT Article
31(3)(c) to support its additional consideration of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of
64Human Rights, in the process of interpreting a BIT's nationality requirements for investors.
The Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic arbitral tribunal also depended upon VCLT article
31(3)(c), in order to take account of the customary international law principle 'that a
deprivation can be justified if it results from the exercise of regulatory actions aimed at the
maintenance of public order.' 65 The reported arbitral awards arising from the 2001-2002
Argentine crisis scarcely developed any cohesive human rights argumentation.66
Another way to accommodate the ICESCR is to treat it as part of the fundamental host
State law to which an investment is continuously subject under 'in accordance with host State
61law' clauses in investment treaties. Much would depend on the actual formulation of the 'in
accordance with host State law' clause; the extent to which the host State properly informs the
investor of the inclusion of the ICESCR in the regulatory fabric governing the investment;68 as
Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press, 2009); United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel', UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 22-33, and 61-82.
61 Azurix Corporation v. Argentina, Decision on Application for Annulment. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12. 1
September 2009, at para. 90. On the minimal resort to VCLT Article 31(3)(c), see Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian
Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 227. 30 November 2009. paras.
260 and 309; Veteran Petroleum Ltd v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA
Case No. AA 228, 30 November 2009, paras. 260 and 309; Hidley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 226, 30 November 2009, paras. 260 and 309;
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Decision on jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 6 July 2007, paras. 207-208.
62 RosInvest Co UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Award on Jurisdiction, SCC Case No. V079/2005, 5 October 2007,
at para. 39.
63 Berschader and Berschader v. Russian Federation, Award and Correction, SCC Case No. 080/2004, 21 April
2006, at para. 95.
64 Micula and ors v. Romania, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20. 24
September 2008, at paras. 86-88.
65 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, PCA (UNCITRAL), 17 March 2006, at paras.
254-255.
66 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 01 /8, 25 April 2005, paras. 114,
121: Siemens AG v. Argentina, Award and Separate Opinion, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 6 February 2007, at para.
79: Azurix Corporation v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12. 23 June 2006, at para. 261.
67 See Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum. 'From Individual to Community Interest in International
Investment Law', pp. 1079-1096, at 1095, in Ulrich Fastenrath. Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Andreas
Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, Christoph Vedder (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in
Honour of hidge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 2011); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Unification Rather than
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law', pp.
45-62, at 59-60 in Dupuy, Francioni, & Petersmann.
68 For the typology of 'in accordance with host State law' clauses, see Stephan Schill. 'Illegal Investments in
Investment Arbitration', working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1979734
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well as the host State's rules for incorporation of international law as part of domestic law. 6 9 In
order to make this interpretation feasible, it should be clearly shown that the ICESCR is part of
the fundamental law of the host State, long before the investment is established. 0 Not every
breach of host State law will disqualify an investment from treaty protection. Minor
administrative errors do not suffice to show that an investment was not made in accordance
with host State law.7' As the arbitral tribunal in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
Worldwide v. Philippines cautioned, the due diligence process enables investors and host States
to jointly ascertain laws that are indeed fundamental to the host State, as opposed to mere
clerical mistakes or administrative errors. 72 'In accordance with host State law' clauses have
recently been amenable to broad teleological interpretations, to safeguard against the
protection of patently illegal investments or investments violative of a State's public policy,
such as violations of anti-dummy legislation in Fraport v. Philippines, criminal laws on bribery
in World Duty Free v. Kenya, and fraud in Inceysa Vallisoletane v. El Salvador.74
Finally, beyond the 'in accordance with host State law' clause, it would also be possible
to usher in ICESCR-sensitive interpretation from more direct treaty language providing for the
ICESCR's continuing applicability and the subordination of investment compliance to the
observance of ICESCR obligations. Some of the newer generations of investment treaties have
adopted more direct treaty language explicitly providing for the continuing applicability of
environmental laws, labor laws, and certain human rights treaties as part of the regulatory fabric
governing the investment, such as the 2004 Model US BIT, the 2004 Model Canadian
76 7FIPA, and BITs concluded by the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union. The 2002
(last accessed 5 March 2012). An example of two 'in accordance with laws and regulations' clauses that fulfill the
two functions described by Schill are Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of the Croatia BIT discussed in paras. 190 and 197 of
MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Chile, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 25 May 2004.
69 See Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3 (The domestic application of
the Covenant). E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, at paras. 7-8.
7o Anderson and ors v. Costa Rica, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/07/3, 10 May 2010, para. 55-59.
7' Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissent, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, 29 April 2004. at
para. 86.
72 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 16
August 2007, at para. 396. See also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 14 August 2007, para. 307 (finding that failure to disclose a legal opinion to a
counter-party before entering into an Agreement does not in itself amount to a breach of international law). For
recent guidance on how to design a due diligence process that is sensitive to ICESCR compliance, see Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food. Olivier De Schutter, Addendum, 'Guiding Principles on Human Rights
Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements', A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. 19 December 2011.
73 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID case No. ARB/00/4. 23
July 2001. at para. 46. This standard was expressly adopted by the arbitral tribunal in Mytilineos Holdings SA v.
Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia, Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Dissenting Opinion, UNCITRAL, 8
September 2006, at para. 152.
74 Id.; World Duty Free Company Ltd v. Kenya, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 25 September 2006; Inceysa
Vallisoletane SL v. El Salvador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 2 August 2006.
See Articles 12 and 13 of the 2012 United States Model BIT, available at www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%/
20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2012)
76 See 11 of the 2004 Canadian Model FIPA, available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model
-en.pdf (last accessed 5 March 2012).
77 See 2004 Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union/Serbia and Montenegro BIT, Articles 5 and 6; 2005
Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union/Republic of Sudan BIT, Articles 5 and 6; 2006 Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union/Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia BIT, Articles 5 and 6; 2005 Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union/Guatemala BIT Articles 13 and 14; 2004 Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union/Libya Arab
Jamahiriya BIT. Articles 5 and 6; 2005 Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union/Mauritius BIT, Articles 5 and 6:
2005 Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union/Peru BIT. Articles 5 and 6.
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Austria-Malta BIT expressly provides for the application of the European Convention on
Human Rights in disputes arising from the BIT.78 These provisions have not yet been tested
and interpreted in concrete disputes, but they are well worth examining for a host State that
plans to include the ICESCR as part of the corpus of host State law.
3. THE ICESCR AND VALUATION DEFENSES
A brief survey of the reported arbitral awards involving the 2001-2002 Argentine financial
crisis shows that compensation was awarded to investors largely for Argentina's breach of
non-expropriation standards (e.g. fair and equitable treatment standard, full protection and
security standard, national treatment) and not based on a finding of direct or indirect
expropriation. Among the arbitral awards that held Argentina internationally responsible for
the measures it implemented during its 2001-2002 financial crisis, the awards in El Paso, LG
& E, Impregilo, Sempra, Azurix, Enron, CMS, BG Group, Suez, and Total held that Argentina
breached the FET standard in the respective BITs at issue in each case, and determined the
compensation owed by Argentina under the general law of international responsibility. The
same awards rejected the claims against Argentina for alleged violation of the direct or
indirect expropriation provisions in an investment treaty, which usually contained an explicit
clause on prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.79 The award in Compaiia de Aguas
del Aconquia SA and Vivendi Universal SA found that Argentina violated the FET standard,
full protection and security standard, and the BIT provision on expropriation, and thus applied
methods of compensation arising from both general international law (for breaches of FET
and full protection and security) and the BIT (for violation of the expropriation provision).80
While all of the foregoing arbitral awards generally referred to compensation as a form
of reparations permissible within the Chorz6w standard,81 there is no precise unanimity
among these awards insofar as the method for determining the quantum of compensation is
concerned. In the 2011 Award in El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina,82 the
arbitral tribunal concurred with the tribunal's view in SD Myers v. Canada8 3 that 'the silence
of the treaty indicates the intention of the drafters 'to leave it open to tribunals to determine a
Agreement between the Republic of Austria and Malta on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments,
29 May 2002. Article 18(2).
79 See among others El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
27 October 2011, para. 752; LG&E Energy Corp and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability. ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006, para. 267; Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, Final award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011, part VI; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, 18 September 2007, para. 486; Azurix Corporation v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
23 June 2006, para. 442; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, 22 May 2007, para. 453; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005. para. 472: National Grid PLC v. Argentina, Award, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL), Case
1:09-cv-00248-RBW. 3 November 2008. para. 296; BG Group plc v. Argentina, Final award, Ad hoc
(UNCITRAL). 24 December 2007. paras. 413-418; Suez and ors v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/117. para. 248; Total SA v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1. 21
December 2010, para. 485.
80 Compania de Aguas del Aconquifa SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, 20 August 2007, para. 11 and 11.1.
8 Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (26 July), at p. 47.
82 Id. at paras. 698-742.
83 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award of 13 November 2000.
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measure of compensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the case', adding that
'whatever precise approach is taken, it should reflect the general principle of international law
that compensation should undo the material harm inflicted by a breach of an international
obligation.' 84 I show in the following subsections that: first, this porous valuation process
ultimately resulted in arbitral tribunals relying mainly on the 'fair market value' standard; and
second, when a host State acts to fulfill the ICESCR during an economic emergency, the 'fair
market value' standard should be readjusted to reflect the requirement of 'foreseeability'
between buyers and sellers, as proposed by dissenting Arbitrator Brigitte Stern in the 2011 El
Paso award.
3.1. Defects in the 'fair market value' standard
The value of an investment can be determined from any, or a combination of, three approaches:
1) the 'Income-Based Approach', which involves 'methods that convert anticipated economic
benefits into a single present value amount'; 2) the 'Market-Based Approach', which refers to
'methods that compare the business or business interest to similar businesses or business
interests'; and 3) the 'Asset-Based Approach', which pertains to 'methods based on the current
market value of assets net of liabilities.' 5 Each of these approaches is intended to derive the
'fair market value' of an investment, defined in the International Glossary of Business
Valuation Terms as:
[T]he price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which the property would
change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and hypothetical willing
and able seller, acting at ann's length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither
is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts.
The above definition has been widely adhered to by arbitral tribunals that dealt with the
Argentine financial crisis, even if the constituent components of 'fair market value' (e.g.
principal or capital contribution, profits, litigation costs, etc.) varied based on the facts of each
case. This definition of 'fair market value' peculiarly presupposes perfectly competitive
markets (e.g. 'an open and unrestricted market') and information readily available to both
buyers and sellers (e.g. 'both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts'). In a world of
government interventions, market entry restrictions, and asymmetric information between
market players, 'fair market value' is a putative fiction.
The definition ultimately assumes that when there has been an interference with
investors' property rights arising from an economic emergency, investors must still be
compensated at the full value of the investment (assuming those same perfect market conditions)
before the economic emergency occurred. 'Fair market value', in this sense, is deliberately
estimated through pre-crisis valuation, and not at the time of the actual 'taking' or 'interference'.
Reliance on the 'fair market value' standard thus ignores the independent impact of the
84 Id. at para. 701.
85 Kantor, at p. 9.
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms, available at www.appraisers.org/Libraries/BVDiscipline/
2009_BVStandards.sflb.ashx (last accessed 30 March 2012).
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deprivation actually caused by the host State's governmental measure, vis-a-vis exogenous
price shocks from an economic emergency that are in no way attributable to the host State's
own acts. By adhering to 'fair market value' under these unrealistic assumptions, arbitral
tribunals effectively set up a mythical standard.
The broad conception of 'fair market value' has also suffused the practices of tribunals
that have dealt with the Argentine crisis, often resulting in uneven constructions of the
constituent elements of 'fair market value'. Tribunals have tended to use 'fair market value' for
both treaty-defined compensation for expropriations, as well as compensation under the general
international law of reparations for non-expropriation breaches of investment treaties. The
frequency of the adoption of the unrealistic 'fair market value' standard suggests that it has
already become the default option for many tribunals.87 The components of 'fair market value'
have not been straightforwardly established in many cases, where at times, the 'fair market
value' of an investment was deemed to include not just the principal capital contribution but
also all other costs presumably incurred to improve the productivity of an investment, such as
additional capital contributions and actual litigation costs.88
Among the Argentine awards that dealt with the issue of reparations for breaches of the
BIT beyond expropriation, the 2005 CMS award provides the clearest and most comprehensive
explanation on resort to compensation as a form of reparations under general international
law.89 At the outset, the CMS tribunal reiterated that compensation 'is only called for when the
damage is not made good by restitution', and that there are a plethora of methods for financially
assessing damage, such as the 'asset value' or 'replacement cost' approach; the 'comparable
transaction' approach; the 'option' approach (alternative uses which can be made of the assets
in question, and their costs and benefits); and the DCF approach. 90 While declaring that
restitution 'is by far the most reliable choice to make the injured party whole', the CMS tribunal
explicitly acknowledged that the Argentine 'crisis cannot be ignored and it has specific
consequences on the question of reparation.' 91 The tribunal did not explain what these
consequences were, but rather went on to acknowledge that in the absence of a compensation
provision for non-expropriation breaches of the BIT, 'the cumulative nature of the breaches... is
best dealt with by resorting to the standard of fair market value'.
Clearly, there are some fissures with the prevalent resort to 'fair market value' in the
arbitral awards that have dealt with the Argentine financial crises. Significantly, in the 2011
Impregilo award, the tribunal did not refer to the fair market value standard but rather awarded
compensation limited solely to the actual principal or capital contributions of the claimant
investor. The Impregilo tribunal agreed with the Chorz6w standard and understood that
87 Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 18 September 2007, at para.
400-405, 412-415; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3.
22 May 2007, paras. 363, 388-389; BG Group PLC v. Argentina, Final award, Ad hoc (UNCITRAL). 24
December 2007. paras. 427-428.
88 Azurix Corporation v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 23 June 2006, paras. 409-432-437.
9 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, paras.
399-469.
90 Id. at note 203, paras. 401 and 403.
91 Id. at para. 406.
92 Id. at para. 410.
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'Impregilo should in principle be placed in the same position as it would have been, had
Argentina's unfair and inequitable treatment of Impregilo's investment not occurred.' 9
However, the tribunal was quick to acknowledge that this ex ante restitution was in no way a
precise or definitive process: 'it would be unreasonable to require precise proof of the extent of
the damage sustained by Impregilo. Instead, reasonable probabilities and estimates have to
suffice as a basis for claims for compensation.' 94 The Impregilo tribunal held that both the
claimant investor as well as the host State Argentina had a shared responsibility for the failure
of the concession, and thus it was 'inappropriate to calculate damages on the basis of customary
economic parameters such as a cost or asset based method or an income method. Instead, the
damages to be paid by the Argentine Republic to compensate for unfair and inequitable
treatment should be determined on the basis of a reasonable estimate of the loss that may have
been caused to Impregilo.'9 ' Compensation was awarded only according to the actual capital
contribution of Impregilo, and not for any potential gains from the concession. 96
To date, the single critique on the impropriety of the broad conception of the 'fair market
value' standard during economic emergencies stems from the opinion of dissenting Arbitrator
Brigitte Stern in the 2011 El Paso v. Argentina award.9 The El Paso tribunal stringently stood
by the above definition of fair market value,98 over the objections of dissenting Arbitrator
Brigitte Stern that a fair market value assessment 'should only take into account what a willing
buyer and a willing seller could foresee at the time of the interference with the investor's rights'.
Arbitrator Stern's approach would have adjusted the scope of 'fair market value' to a value
closer to the time of the actual interference by the host State during Argentine financial crisis,
but the El Paso majority rejected this view. Relying on the Chorz6w standard,99 the El Paso
majority used an Income-Based Approach in the form of the DCF (discounted cash flow)
method of valuation, simply following the preferred method indicated in the Expert's Reports,
and the practice of other arbitral tribunals in cases involving Argentine emergency measures in
CMS, Enron, and Sempra.00 Arbitrator Stern's proposal to restrict the valuation to the to the
'foreseeable' price was quite similar to the method set by the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC) for the valuation of business losses based on past performance, and not
future projections since the emergency (the invasion and occupation of Kuwait) was not a
foreseeable event. 101
As may be seen in the above approaches taken in different arbitrations arising from
Argentina's governmental measures during its 2001/2002 financial crisis, regardless of the
valuation method used, arbitral tribunals have unstintingly adhered to the 'fair market value'
9 Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic, Final award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011, at para. 361.
94 Id. at at para. 371.
9 Id. at paras. 376-378.
96 Id. at paras. 379-381.
97 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 27 October 2011.
98 Id. at paras. 702-703.
99 Id. at para. 705.
'00 Id. at paras. 711-712.
101 United Nations Compensation Commission Governing Council, Decision taken by the Governing Council of
the United Nations Compensation Commission during the resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd meeting, held on 6
March 1992 (Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses: Types of Damages and Their
Valuation). S/AC.26/1992/9, 6 March 1992, paras. 17 and 19.
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standard as the level of compensation. The CMS tribunal acknowledged that Argentina's
economic crisis would have 'specific consequences on the question of reparation',102 but the
ensuing award did not describe in detail the extent (if any), to which Argentina's economic
predicament mattered in the adjustments made by the CMS tribunal under their own customized
asset valuation model. In reaching for the 'fair market value' of an investment as the level of
compensation, the arbitral tribunals did not differentiate between price effects that were
endogenously caused by the Argentine governmental measures, and the price effects that could
have been exogenously caused by the systemic financial crisis as a whole. A very substantial
pre-measure investment value based on this broad 'fair market value' definition, as compared
with a very low post-measure investment value, will certainly yield a large damages or
compensation award to the investor. However, systemic market risk (not firm-specific risk) - a
variable that is separate and independent from the governmental measure that interferes or
infringes with the investor's property rights - could also reduce the post-measure investment
value.103 The extent to which the discount rate fully captures this market risk is not clearly
discussed in any of the currently reported awards involving the Argentine financial crisis. 104
It would appear from the arbitral awards that tribunals confronting the issue of valuation
have tended to favor somewhat linear comparisons between the value of an investment before
the imposition of a governmental measure ('pre-measure investment value'), with its value
after the imposition ('post-measure investment value'). The value of the investment refers to
'fair market value', and can include the principal, the profit stream, expected earnings, and
other items that the tribunal could understandably include due to the very broad definition of
'fair market value'. The positive differential between pre-measure investment value and
post-measure investment value then operates as the 'damage' attributable to the host State for
imposing the governmental measure. The very rationale of compensation is to protect the
investors' 'expectancy interest' under the Chorzdw standard (e.g. compensation that seeks to
return the investor to a position in which the investment has been made had the injury not
occurred).ios However, it is precisely that quantum of the alleged expectancy interest that needs
reassessment. The 'fair market value' standard used hitherto in economic emergencies or
financial crises has not properly differentiated between endogenous effects (the deprivation
caused by the host State's governmental measure on the value of investment) and exogenous
effects (the overall market effects on price, in no way attributable to the acts of the host State).
Lacking this differentiation, the pre-measure valuation of an investment based on the broad
'fair market value' definition is arguably already overestimated at the time the arbitral tribunal
makes the comparison between the pre-measure investment value and the post-measure
investment value. Equitable adjustments of the valuation are warranted.
102 Id. at para. 406.
'03 See Aswath Damodaran, Investment I'aluation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of any Asset
(John Wiley & Sons, 2012), at p. 59; Kantor at pp. 145-146.
104 See Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law (Oxford
University Press, 2009), at p. 152, paras. 3.337 and 3.338.
105 Andrea Saldarriaga and Mark Kantor, 'Calculating Damages: Arbitrators, Counsel, and Experts Can Do Better
than They Have in the Past', pp. 196-237. at p. 222. in Kevin W. Lu. Gero Verheyen, and Srilal M. Perera (eds.).
Investing with Confidence: Understanding Political Risk Management in the 21s' Century (World Bank. 2009).
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3.2. Equitable adjustments under the general international law of reparations
To reiterate, arbitral tribunals have generally relied on their own discretion to use the 'fair
market value' standard of compensation as the standard of compensation for non-expropriation
breaches of investment treaty standards. 106 While it is the general law of international
responsibility that governs the terms of reparations for non-expropriation breaches,
compensation is but one of the forms of reparation under Article 36 of the ILC Articles of State
Responsibility. The same Article does not provide for a scientific process for determining
compensation. As seen in the Argentine cases discussed in the previous section, arbitral
tribunals privilege certain factual and economic assumptions as they set pre-crisis and
post-crisis asset valuations; determine the foreseeability of the economic crisis and its impact
on the risk premium (if any) on the investment; and forecast quantitative estimates of the likely
'fair market value' of the investment or the deprivation of the economic benefits of the
investment as a result of Argentina's emergency measures during the 2001/2002 financial crisis.
These judgment calls are unique to the arbitral tribunals' own appreciation of how to
approximate the 'financially assessable damage' contemplated for compensation as defined in
Article 36 of the ILC Articles. Existing arbitration practices show that losses may be
categorized according to 'full loss of investment's value', the 'diminution in investment's
value', 'unpaid taxes or contract price', 'loss of dividends by a shareholder', 'losses due to
temporary interference', and 'loss of invested amounts'.107
However, a fundamental axiom of compensation under Article 36 of the ILC Articles is
that it is not intended to be punitive, exemplary, or expressive.108 The ILC specifically requires
that the determination of compensation owed to the injured State must contain 'an evaluation of
the respective behavior of the parties and, more generally, a concern to reach an equitable and
acceptable outcome.'1 09 This should also include the extent to which a party observed prudence
to mitigate its own damages.' 10 As a matter of equity, therefore, it would not be unreasonable
for the arbitral tribunal to adjust the quantum of compensation, in view of the host State's good
faith observance of the ICESCR during an economic emergency. Several arbitral tribunals have
relied on 'equitable considerations"" to adjust the quantum of compensation downward,
taking into account the peculiarity of fact-patterns on a case to case basis and the inherent
subjectivity of the valuation process.112 Equitable considerations are perfectly suited to
106 Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL. 2008). at pp. 90-91.
107 Ripinsky and Williams, at pp. 91-92.
'0s Id. at note 170, p. 99, para. 4. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 175, p. 204, para. 76; Corfu Channel case, Judgment of December 15th 1949,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244.
109 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with Commentaries, 2001, at p. 76, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commenta
ries/9 6 2001.pdf (last accessed 2 March 2012).
110 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfil Acts.
with Commentaries, 2001. at p. 93. para. 11 available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/co
mmentaries/9_6 2001.pdf (last accessed 2 March 2012).
. Id., citing LIAMCO v. Libya, Award of 12 April 1977; Tecmed v. Mexico, Award of 29 May 2003, para. 190;
AMT v. Zaire, Award of 21 February 1997, para. 7.16; Kuwait v. Aminoil, Award of 24 March 1982, para. 78;
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, Award of 17 February 2000, paras. 92 and 103; Himpurna v. PLA, Final Award of 4
May 1999. para. 237
112 Ripinsky and Williams, at pp. 124-126.
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situations where adjudication inimitably involves some discretionary ambiguity,'13 and have
been applied by arbitral tribunals, such as the United States Special Mexican Claims
Commissions 14 and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal,' 15 in the absence of a settled procedure for
determining compensation. Arbitral tribunals seeking to apply compensation under Article 36
of the ILC articles to non-expropriation breaches of a BIT should acknowledge that they engage
in a discretionary exercise, and as such, be equally amenable to arguments on equity and
fairness arising from the host State's good faith fulfillment of its ICESCR obligations during an
economic emergency.
4. CONCLUSION: INVESTMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS COMPLEMENTARY SPHERES
OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Governance is a complex process of authoritative decision-making to serve the public interest.
However, the 'public interest' is in reality, an amalgam of many interests that ultimately
redound to the overall benefit of the State and its individual constituents. As observed in recent
scholarship, the 'public interest' refers to 'some type of commonality or common characteristic
between and among citizens' (such as the protection of individual rights as well as private
property), and its application cannot be dissociated from the 'conception and use of political
power... [which] is the fulcrum for balancing the interests of the state with the common
interests, group interests, and the like'.1 16 The 'public interest' is thus generally concerned with
matters of both efficiency (the size of the overall endowments available to society) as well as
equity (the relative distribution of those endowments to individuals under a fair and just
process).' 17 It is in this sense that human rights and investment protection are both matters of
public interest. Investment hearkens to the efficiency dimension of the public interest by
affecting the material conditions contributing to 'inherent dignity of the human person'.
Human rights protection appeals to the equity dimension of the public interest by guaranteeing
and preserving equal and non-discriminatory access of all individuals to social and economic
goods. While human rights protection starkly and visibly exemplifies the public interest, it may
also be said that generating economic development through welfare-improving and responsible
See Mark Weston Janis, 'The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law', 9 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 7 (1983). at pp.
25-26 (restating Lauterpacht's acceptance of the use of equity in discretionary situations).
114 United States Special Mexican Claims Commission, Decision A.] (1938) 32 AJIL 858.
115 CAL International Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No.
245, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Award of 27 December 1983; Starrett Housing v. the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Award of 19 December 1983: Eastman Kodak v. the Islamic Republic of1ran, Award of 1 July 1991.
116 Stephen M. King, Bradley S. Chilton, and Gary E. Roberts, 'Reflections on Defining the Public Interest'. 41
Administration & Society (6 November 2010) 954. at p. 957.
117 See Burton A. Weisbrod, 'Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis', pp. 4-29. at
p. 4, in Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, and Neil K. Komesar, Public Interest Law: An Economic and
Institutional Analysis (University of California Berkeley Press, 1978).
118 See Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2009), at pp.
106-109; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21
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investment practices is also another dimension of the public interest. 119 This article proceeds
from this fundamental premise.
While one might be readily tempted to epitomize human rights protection as the fully
disinterested representation of the public interest, and investment protection as nothing but the
nefarious assertions of the private commercial interests of foreign investors, 12 0 the reality of
genuine 'public interest' protection cannot be reduced to an easy 'either-or' dichotomy. The
'legitimacy' literature in international investment scholarship has pointed out numerous areas
of procedural and substantive deficiencies, such as the lack of transparency and democratic
accountability in international investment treaty-making and investment arbitration; 121
allegedly biased procedures and outcomes that supposedly favor investors predominantly over
host States and their constituents;122 and most importantly, the diminution of governments'
domestic policy and regulatory spaces due to the commitments they assume under international
investment agreements (HAs). 123 These are points to consider for systemic reform 124
(especially recent withdrawals from ICSID system by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela),m5 but
not to draw a sweeping conclusion that there is a hard-and-fast 'clash of paradigms' ascribed
from the 'public interest' orientation of human rights defenders sullied by the alleged 'private
119 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'Foreign Investment and the Changing Global Economic Reality', pp. x1iii-liii in Jos6 E.
Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant, Kamil G6rard Ahmed and Gabriela P. Vizcaino (eds.), The Evolving International
Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford University Press. 2011): Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 'Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits.
Minimising Costs'. (2002 Report). available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/1959815.pdf (last accessed 25
February 2012).
120 See representative views and critiques against different features of the investment arbitration practice,
procedure, and process in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung, and Claire Balchin (eds.), The
Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010).
121 Howard Mann, 'Civil Society Perspectives: What Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International
Investment Regime?'. pp. 22-29, at 24, in Jos6 E. Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant. Kamil G6rard Ahmed and Gabriela
P. Vizcaino (eds.), The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford
University Press. 2011).
122 See Osgoode Hall Public Statement on the International Investment Regime. 31 August 2010, at www.osgoode
.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf (last accessed 25
February 2012).
123 See Stephan W. Schill, 'Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach', 52 Virg. J Int'l L. 1 (2011), pp. 57-102 at p. 66
('Host states are particularly concerned about a shrinking of domestic policy space occasioned by vague standards
of investment protection, which are interpreted. partly in inconsistent ways, by international arbitrators who
exercise significant interpretative powers over the content of investment treaty obligations, and who are de facto
even able to restrict the policy choices made by democratically-elected legislators. without themselves enjoying a
robust democratic mandate.')
124 Among some of the works on the subject, see Susan D. Franck, 'The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions', 73 Fordham L. Rev. 4 (2005), at
pp. 1521-1625; David Schneiderman, 'Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment Arbitration: A New
Self-Restraint?', 2 J Int'l. Disp. Settlement 2 (2011), pp. 471-495; Christopher M. Ryan, 'Meeting Expectations:
Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of International Investment Law', 29 U. Pa. J Int'l L. 3 (2008).
at pp. 725-761: Erlend M. Leonhardsen, 'Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration', J. Int'l. Disp. Settlement (2011), pp. 1-42: Christina Cathey Schuetz, 'Legitimacy
and Inconsistency: Is Investment Arbitration Broken And If So. Can or Should it Be Fixed', Ch. 12 in Ian a. Laird
and Todd J. Weiler (eds.), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (Juris Publishing, May 2010);
Charles N. Brower and Stephan W. Schill, 'Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?', 9 Chi. J. Int'1L. 471 (2009).
125 Luke Eric Peterson, 'Venezuelan Exit from ICSID Raises Questions both Legal and Financial', 31 January
2012, Investment Arbitration Reporter, at www.iareporter.com/articles/20120131_3 (last accessed 25 February
2012).
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law' mandate and purely commercial dispositions of investment arbitrators. 12 6 The alleged
mutual exclusivity of 'public interest' advocacies and investment arbitration is often assumed,
but to date remains unproven. Rigid characterizations make doctrinal solutions for host States
more elusive.
The suitability of the defenses discussed in this article will largely depend on the actual
policy needs of host States according to their particular fiscal circumstances in a given
economic emergency. Authoritative decision-makers in host States owe their mandate, as well
as bases of power, to many constituencies - from the domestic voter population, influential
party alliances, as well as possibly to external institutions that may also have an interest in
ensuring the uninterrupted flow of continued financial assistance to a host State during the
economic emergencies. If the goal of the host State's authoritative decision-maker is to achieve
the maximal level of socioeconomic protection for its citizens during the economic emergency,
its allocation of governmental resources to meet the ICESCR appears, at first glance, to be
entirely well-justified. However, where fiscal resources are scarce, and the host State is
impelled to seek recourse to external sovereign financing to ensure continued socioeconomic
protection of its vulnerable domestic population,12 it could also be the case that it would not
serve the interests of the host State to adopt a 'beggar thy neighbor' position,128 such as
arbitrary foreign exchange controls and currency depreciations, unlimited borrowing from
emergency funds in international financial institutions (with the full intention of summarily and
unilaterally repudiating these obligations altogether), or purposely interfering with trade flows
to cut imports and induce a domestic trade surplus. Host States would do well to calibrate their
compliance policies, taking into consideration the likely impact of non-performance of one
international obligation relative to the other, and formulate the least-costly strategy for
performance of the international obligation that best contributes to its goal of socio-economic
protection during the economic emergency.
Finally, it is important for the authoritative decision-makers of the host State to
acknowledge that their choices between performing one international obligation (and not the
other) do not take place in a vacuum. The state of the global political economy - and the
interrelationships between markets, labor, institutions, and financing - bears significance for
the achievement of the host State's goals during the economic emergency. Obviously, resource
endowments and monetary capabilities will differ between developed country host States, and
developing country host States. However, it is developing country host States that will be most
126 See Anthea Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System', 106
Am. J. Int'lL. (2012. forthcoming).
127 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Statement on an Evaluation of the Obligation to Take
Steps to the 'Maximum of Available Resources' Under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Thirty-Eighth
Session. 30 April-18 May 2007, E/C.12/2007/1. 10 May 2007. at para. 5 ('The undertaking by a State party to use
'the maximum' of its available resources entitles it to receive resources offered by the international community. In
this regard, the phrase 'to the maximum of available resources' refers to both the resources existing within a State
as well as those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance.')
128 See World Bank Development Report (1987), at p. 139. See also Tim Weithers, Foreign Exchange: A
Practical Guide to FX Markets (Wiley and Sons. 2011); Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and Meera Warrier, A Dictionary
of Globalization (Taylor & Francis, 2007). at p. 47.
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challenged to provide socioeconomic protection and observe the ICESCR during economic
crises, and will most likely face sensitive political choices.129
Considering the reality of developing countries' dependence on international support and
development financing particularly in times of economic crisis, authoritative decision-makers
of the host State must exert utmost efforts to observe the ICESCR without need of resorting to a
unilateral repudiation of investment treaty obligations. Temporary non-performance of the duty
to compensate investors during an economic emergency is one thing, but rejecting any degree
of future international responsibility outright for the non-performance exposes the host State to
a myriad of domino consequences in the international sphere. These could include the likely
reluctance of sovereign creditor states to lend development financing; the increased political
risk that could deter future foreign investment flows and sources of capital to the host State, as
well as a litany of potential inter-State suits in the event that investors' States of nationality
adopt and elevate their claims against the host State through diplomatic protection. As this
article has attempted to show, there are various plausible defenses to enable a host State to
prioritize the ICESCR during an economic emergency), without having to resort to extreme
defections from international responsibility through investment repudiation, and ultimately
jeopardizing the host State's future prospects of economic growth and development as a
responsible member of the contemporary community of nations.'o Governing for the public
interest necessitates these seemingly pedestrian, but ultimately doctrinally careful, calibrations.
129 United Nations, 'World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012' (United Nations, New York, 2012), at pp.
xvi-xix, available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wespcurrent/2012wesp.pdf (last accessed 5
March 2012).
130 See UNCTAD, 'The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries' (2009). at pp. 14-26 (showing that IIAs contribute to the 'coherence, transparency,
predictability, and stability of investment frameworks of host countries', at p. 25).
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